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THE DEMAND REQUIREMENT AND MUTUAL FUND
ADVISORY FEE SUITS: AN
INCOMPATIBLE COMBINATION ?
Congress passed the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA)1 to correct adverse conditions within the investment company industry.2 At the
time of the ICA's enactment, however, Congress was not concerned with
the level of compensation that investment companies paid to investment
advisers.' Investment advisers normally receive compensation for their
services at rates based on the size of investment company assets. 4 Following the enactment of the ICA, investment advisory fee rates remained
at a fixed percentage of investment company assets 5 while spectacular
, Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
5 80a-1 to -64 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b) (1976). Congress enacted the Investment Company Act (ICA)
in 1940 to correct adverse conditions within the investment company industry including
lack of adequate information disclosure to fund shareholders, management structures creati'ng
conflicts of interest between directors and shareholders, discriminatory practices in the
issuance of securities, unsound accounting principles, changes in fund investment policy
without shareholder consent, excessive borrowing that increased investment risk, and operation of investment companies without sufficient assets. See id. The primary means by which
the ICA sought to control these adverse conditions was through a requirement that not
more than 60% of a fund's board consist of directors affiliated with an investment adviser.
Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686 S 2(a)(3), 54 Stat. 789; see Burks v. Lasker, 441
U.S. 471, 482 (1979). The 1970 amendment to the ICA strengthened this requirement by
changing "affiliated" to not "interested." See 15 U.S.C. SS 80a-10(a), 80a-2(a)(19) (1976); infra
note 24 (definitions of affiliated and interested persons; see also infra note 9 and accompanying text (1970 amendment to ICA).
Investment companies are corporations or trusts that sell shares to the public and
reinvest the proceeds in a wide variety of funds that consist of relatively low-risk, diversified portfolios of market securities. See Fabozzi & Groppelli, Investment Companies, in
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: SECURITIES, OPTIONS. FUTURES 507 (F. Fabozzi & F. Zarb
eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Investment Companies]. Investment company stockholders
share in the returns that the company realizes through the efforts of market analysts who
develop portfolios, and administrators who manage fund assets. See id. at 507-08.
1 See Phillips &Powell, Controlsover Management Compensation Under the Investment
Company Act, in THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 481 (PLI 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Management Compensation];infra note 23 and accompanying text (function of investment
advisers).
' See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS

OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH; H. REP. No. 2337,89th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as PPI]; 2 T. FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS 255 (1978). Compensation rates for investment advisers generally are about .5% of fund assets and the rates
normally decline as the size of the fund increases. Investment Companies, supra note 2, at
517; see, e.g., infra note 85 (describing compensation rate of investment advisers in Weiss
v. Temporary Investment Fund, 692 F.2d 928, 931 (3d Cir. 1982)). The payments some advisers receive fluctuate with the performance of the fund. See Investment Companies,supra
note 2, at 517.
5 See WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE. A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS. H.R.
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growth occurred in the assets of mutual fund investment companies.' Due
to economies of scale in the performance of mutual fund advisory services,'
the compensation of investment advisers grew at a greater rate than their
expenses.' Consequently, in amending the ICA in 1970, Congress added
a new provision, section 36(b),9 in an effort to control excessive investment advisory fees." Section 36(b) grants the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and investment company shareholders an express cause
of action to recover excessive compensation that investment companies
pay to investment advisers."

REP. No. 2247,87th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1962). In 1960, mutual funds generally paid advisory
fees at an average fixed rate of .5% of average net assets. See id. at 28, 480.
' See H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970). Between 1941 and 1970 the net
assets of investment companies increased dramatically. Id. In particular, the size of mutual
fund investment company assets burgeoned from $450 million to $53 billion during that
period. Id. A mutual fund is a type of investment company that continuously offers new
shares for public sale and will redeem outstanding shares at market value. 15 U.S.C. S 80a-5
(1976); see Investment Companies, supra note 2, at 508. Also called open-end investment companies, mutual funds are the most dominant and dynamic components of the investment
company industry. See PPI, supra note 4, at 42-45. The other type of investment company,
called the closed-end investment company, does not offer to buy or sell its own shares on
a continual basis. See Investment Companies, supra note 2, at 508. Closed-end investment
companies sell their shares in the same manner as other publicly traded companies, and
trading in the securities markets determines the value of closed-end company shares. See
id. at 508, 510.
Many variations of mutual funds exist. See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 1982
MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 22-24 (1982) [hereinafter cited as MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK]. Traditional mutual funds invest in common stocks, preferred stocks, and bonds, the quantities,
combinations, and characteristics of which differ depending upon the fund objective. See
id. at 15, 21. Money market and municipal bond funds are more recent additions to the
mutual fund industry. See id. at 22. Money market funds purchase high-yield money market
instruments including United States government securities, bank certificates of deposit
and commercial paper. See id. at 15. Municipal bond funds, also called Tax-Exempt Money
Market Funds, invest in municipal securities with relatively short maturities. See id.
I See S. REP. No. 184,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4897,4902 (economies of scale attributable to dramatic growth of mutual fund industry).
I See Proposed Amendments to the Investment Company Act. Hearings on H.R. 9511
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Financeof the House Comm. on Interstate Commerce,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1967) (statement of M. Cohen, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)). One investment adviser received an anual fee that increased
by almost 200% between 1961 and 1964 while the same adviser's operating expenses increased by only 80% during the same period. See id.
9 15 U.S.C. 5 80a-35(b) (1976).
10 Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413
(1970) (amending 15 U.S.C. §5 80a-1 to -52 (1964)). In addition to creating a provision to control investment company advisory fees, the 1970 amendments to the ICA sought to regulate
mutual fund sales commissions, to permit banks and savings and loan associations to operate
accounts in competition with mutual funds, and generally to update and improve the. ICA
and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. See S. REp. No. 184,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted
in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4897, 4898.
" See 15 U.S.C. 5 80a-35(b) (1976).
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As a result of the continued expansion of mutual fund assets, 2 fund
shareholders have instituted numerous suits alleging that the growth of
the funds has produced excessive advisory fees in violation of section
36(b).1 Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ordinarily requires shareholders instituting derivative actions to make a demand on
directors prior to bringing suit.'4 Shareholder plaintiffs have asserted,
however, that application of the demand requirement in section 36(b) actions is contrary to Congress' intent to create an effective means to obtain judicial review of investment advisory compensation.m Congress
enacted section 36(b) with an awareness that the interests of mutual fund
directors regarding advisory compensation generally conflict with the objectives of fund shareholders. 6 Section 36(b) plaintiffs consequently have
argued that a demand on directors would be futile in mutual fund advisory
fee suits.1 7 The failure of plaintiffs to make a demand on investment company directors has resulted in the dismissal of many section 36(b) actions,18
and in several cases courts have not allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaints to reflect a subsequent demand on directors. 9 In recent decisions,

'2See 1 SEC. REG. GUIDE (P-H) 1.5 (Jan. 12,1983) (sales of mutual funds in 1982 largest
ever). In a relatively short period of time, mutual funds have become the fourth largeit
type of financial institution in the United States, behind commercial banks, savings and
loan associations, and insurance companies. See MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK,supranote 6, at
15; see also Hudson, Mutual Funds Urged to StartInspection Unit, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1983,
at 4, col. 1 (mutual fund industry major force in national economy).
13 See infra notes 30-54 and accompanying text (shareholder S 36(b) suits since 1970
amendment).
" See-FED.R. CIv. P. 23.1 (requiring shareholder derivative action complaints to allege
efforts, or reasons for failing to make efforts, to obtain desired action from directors).
" See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (1982),
petitionfor cert. filed sub nor., Grossman v. Fidelity Municipal Bond Fund, 51 U.S.L.W.
3027 (U.S. June 25, 1982) (No. 81-2361) (arguing demand requirement undercuts congressional intent of creating effective means for shareholders to obtain judicial review of advisory compensation), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 85 (1982).
" See S. REP. No. 184,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4897, 4898 (recognizing potential conflicts of interest in setting of advisory fees).
17 See e.g., Blatt v. Dean Witter Reynolds Intercapital, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1152, 1154
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (§ 36(b) suit in which plaintiffs argued demand was empty formality);
Markowitze v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542, 554-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (plaintiff argued demand should
be excused as futile in § 36(b) suit).
" See Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, 692 F.2d 928, 943-44 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming
dismissal of § 36(b) suit for failure to make demand); Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115,
118, 126 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 85 (1982); Jerozal v. Cash Reserve Management, Inc. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,019, at 94,822 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (dismissing
536(b) action for failing to make demand); Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542, 562-63 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (same).
19 See, e.g., Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, 692 F.2d 928, 943 (3d Cir. 1982) (rejecting
plaintiff's request for leave to amend complaint after making demand on investment dompany directors); Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115, 125-26 (1st Cir.) (plaintiffs demand
after filing complaint did not rectify initial failure to make demand before bringing suit),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 85 (1982).
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several United States circuit courts of appeals have reached discordant
conclusions on whether shareholders must make a demand on investment
company directors prior to instituting a section 36(b) claim.'
Mutual funds are investment companies that continuously offer new
shares for public sale and will redeem outstanding shares at market value.2
The mutual fund industry is characterized by an external management
structure.' A separate legal entity, the investment adviser, typically
creates the mutual fund and appoints the fund's directors.' In most cases,
chief executives or employees of the investment adviser serve on the fund's
board of directors.' After the fund's creation, the board enters into a con-

' See Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, 692 F.2d 928, 943-44 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming
dismissal of S 36(b) suit for failure to make demand); Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 692 F.2d
250, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding demand requirement inapplicable in S 36(b) suit), cert.
grantedsub nom. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 51 U.S.L.W. 3646 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1983) (No.
82-1200); Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115, 118, 126 (1st Cir.) (affirming dismissal of
S 36(b) suit for failure to make demand), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 85 (1982); infra notes 53-98
and accompanying text (discussing Weiss, Fox and Grossman).
21 See supra note 6 (describing mutual funds).
2 See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480-81 (1979); Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund,
692 F.2d 928, 932 (3d Cir. 1982); S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprintedin 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4897, 4901. Mutual fund management differs from the management of closed-end investment companies. See Investment Companies, supra note 2, at 517;
supra note 6 (describing mutual funds and closed-end investment companies). Officers of
a brokerage or investment banking firm usually manage closed-end companies while a mutual
fund generally hires an investment adviser to provide research and management services.
See Investment Companies, supra note 2, at 517. Courts and commentators have described
mutual funds as shell corporations that merely contain a pool of liquid assets. See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,434 U.S. 934 (1977); Galfand v. Chestnutt
Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1976); Randall, FiduciaryDuties of Investment Company
Directorsand Management Companies Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 31 OKLA.
L. REV. 635, 636 (1978) [hereinafter cited as FiduciaryDuties].
I See Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, 692 F.2d 928, 933 (3d Cir. 1982); Hearings on
S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967)
(statement of M. Cohen, Chairman, SEC). Investment advisers develop and manage the portfolios of investment companies while analyzing the economy, securities markets, and particular industries. See 1 T. FRANKEL, supra note 4, at 20. Investment advisers also may provide
investment companies with brokerage and administrative services in addition to supplying
office space, salaries and compensation to officers and directors, payments for legal and
custodian fees, and clerical, bookkeeping, auditing and accounting services. See id. at 20-21.
U See PPI, supra note 4, at 46; Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unaffiliated Directors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1058,1059-60 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as UnaffiliatedDirectors].The ICA requires at least 40% of the directors
of a mutual fund to be disinterested. 15 U.S.C. S 80a-10(a) (1976). If the adviser is also the
mutual fund's principle underwriter, 50% of the fund directors must be disinterested. Id.
S 80a-10(b)(1); see T. FRANKEL, supra note 4, at 42-56. A director is interested with respect
to an investment adviser if he has an ownership interest in, is on the board of directors
of, or has close ties to the investment adviser, or if he is affiliated or related to persons
affiliated with the investment adviser. 15 U.S.C. S 80a-2(a)(19) (1976). A person affiliated
with an investment adviser is one who controls 5o of the outstanding voting securities
of the adviser, controls the adviser, or is an officer, director or employee of the adviser.
Id. S 80a-2(a)(3).
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tract with the investment adviser and agrees to pay the adviser a commission in exchange for management and investment services.2 5 Since the
investment adviser creates and controls the mutual fund," the fees that
the adviser charges to the fund are not the product of arm's length
bargaining." By imposing a fiduciary obligation on investment advisers
with respect to their compensation, section 36(b) seeks to minimize the
potential conflicts arising out of the external management structure of
the mutual fund industry.28
Shareholders have filed several section 36(b) actions since the provision became effective in 1972,1 but most of the ensuing litigation has
focused on procedural issues.20 Until a recent Second Circuit decision in
I See S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4897,4901. Investment advisory contracts must specify all compensation the fund will
pay pursuant to the agreement. 15 U.S.C. S80a-15(a)(1) (1976). Advisory contracts generally
describe the calculation of fees and the method of valuing assets, as well as the investment
objectives of the fund and any restrictions on investment policy. See Carlson, Opening Accounts, Suitability, DiscretionaryAccounts and Investment Advisory Contracts in COUNSELING THE INVESTMENT ADVISER, 385, 398-400 (PLI 1975). Advisory contracts usually are
renewable yearly and either party may cancel on 30 days notice. See Investment Companies,
supra note 2, at 517. The investment adviser often guarantees to pay expenses that the
fund incurs in excess of a certain limit as insurance that the adviser will not exceed an
appropriate expense margin. See 2 T. FRANKEL, supra note 4, at 246.
' See FiduciaryDuties, supra note 22, at 636. Unlike the conventional corporation
that directly pays company officers, who generally have a substantial equity investment
in the corporation, the mutual fund is dependent on its investment adviser, which primarily
is interested in maximizing its own profits. See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977). Mutual fund directors usually receive a nominal
salary or none at all. See UnaffiliatedDirectors,supra note 24, at 1060. Mutual fund directors that are affiliated, however, receive significant compensation from investment advisers,
or from affiliated brokers or underwriters. See id.; supra note 24 (describing affiliated
directors).
27 See S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4897, 4901. Competition between investment advisers for advisory contracts rarely,
if ever, exists. PPI, supra note 4, at 126-27.
" See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976); S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin
1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4897, 4898.

' See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-52 (1976) (§ 36(b) effective as of June 14, 1972, eighteen months
after enactment).
" See, e.g., Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 1981) (§ 36(b) not applicable
in suit alleging adviser and affiliated fund directors failed to recapture brokerage commissions), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 65,(1982); In re Gartenberg, 636 F.2d 16, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1980)
(shareholder S 36(b) suit not entitled to jury trial), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 910 (1981); Lerner
v. Reserve Management Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,036, at
91,366-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (5 36(b) suit barred by res judicata since prior suit involving same
parties and issues settled, and settlement agreement still effective); Halligan v. Standard
& Poor's/Intercapital, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 1082, 1085 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (denying motion to dismiss
S 36(b) claim for failure to state claim); Frankel v. Hyde, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,486, at 95,710-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (shareholder action alleging officers
and directors of adviser to closed-end investment company failed to capture brokerage commissions stated cause of action under S 36(b)); see also infra notes 37-98 and accompanying
text (S 36(b). cases considering demand requirement application).
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Gartenbergv. MerrillLynch Asset Management,' no court had considered
the measure of advisory fees that constitutes a violation of fiduciary duty
under section 36(b).2 In Gartenberg,the Second Circuit sought to define
a standard of fiduciary obligation under section 36(b) that would take into
account the absence of competition between investment advisers for
mutual fund business.' The Gartenbergcourt stated that if advisory compensation is so disproportionately high that the fee is not related
reasonably to the services the adviser renders and could not have been
negotiated at arm's length, then the adviser has breached its fiduciary
obligation under section 36(b).' In Gartenberg,the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal of two consolidated section 36(b) suits, but
did not hold that the disputed advisory fee contract was fair and
reasonable.15 The Gartenberg court concluded instead that the plaintiffs
had failed to present enough evidence to prove a breach of fiduciary duty
36
under section 36(b).

With the exception of the Gartenbergdecision and a few court-approved
"1694 F2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
See Krasner v. Dreyfus Corp., 90 F.R.D. 665, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (to court's knowledge
no S 36(b) suit recovered on merits); Note, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees-Too Much for Too
Little?, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 530,53141 (1980) (no S 36(b) suit recovered on merits) [hereinafter
cited as 48 FORDHAM NOTE]; but cf. infranote 37 (determination of advisory fee fairness in
court-approved settlement).
' See 694 F.2d at 933. In Gartenberg,shareholders of the Merrill Lynch Ready Assets
Trust (ML Fund) charged that Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc. (ML Management),
the adviser and manager of ML Fund, violated S 36(b) by accepting an unreasonably high
fee that was disproportionate to the costs of the services rendered to ML Fund. Id. at
924-25; Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1043 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (district court opinion). ML Fund paid the challenged fees to ML Management for
various services, including investment advice and processing of fund shareholder daily orders.
694 F.2d at 925. ML Management also manages all of the operations of ML Fund and provides all of the office space and facilities, administrative staff, and equipment necessary
to conduct ML Fund's operations. Id. The fee charged by ML Management is based on
a percentage of the average daily value of ML Fund's net assets. Id. As ML Fund's total
assets increase in value the fee rate declines. Id. at 926.
See 694 F.2d at 928. To apply the arms-length bargaining test properly, the Gartenberg
court emphasized that Congress intended the courts to consider all of the facts that are
relevant to a determination of whether the amount of compensation constituted an observance or a breach of the adviser's fiduciary duty. See id. at 930 (citing S. REP. No. 184,91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4897,4910). The Gartenberg
court recognized a number of factors that are important in evaluating the fiduciary obligation under S 36(b), including the cost of providing the advisory service, the nature and quality
of the service, the extent to which the adviser realizes economies of scale, and the volume
of the orders that the adviser must process. See id. The Gartenbergcourt rejected, however,
the district court's suggestion that a comparison of the level of advisory fees charged to
other funds should be a primary consideration in the evaluation of a fee's fairness. See id.
at 928-29.
" See 694 F.2d at 933. In contrast to the Second Circuit's holding in Gartenberg, the
district court found the advisory fee contract to be fair and reasonable. See Gartenberg
v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, 528 F. Supp. at 1055.
See 694 F.2d at 933.
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settlements,' section 36(b) litigation primarily has focused on the issue
of whether the demand requirement imposed by rule 23.1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 8 applies to section 36(b) claims. 9 Rule 23.1 requires shareholder derivative action complaints to allege the plaintiffs
effort to obtain the desired action from the corporation's directors or, if
the plaintiff does not make such an effort, the reason for failing to do
so.40 The earliest recorded decision on the issue of whether the demand
requirement applies in section 36(b) suits is Boyko v. Reserve Fund, Inc.4
In Boyko, the District Court for the Southern District of New York denied
a motion to dismiss a shareholder section 36(b) claim on the grounds that
the plaintiff shareholder failed to comply with the rule 23.1 demand
requirement.' The Boyko court stated that the demand requirement would
thwart Congress' purpose in enacting section 36(b) because fund directors would seek to terminate any shareholder action brought against the
fund's advisor for receipt of excessive compensation.43 The Boyko court
See, e.g., Lewis v. Oppenheimer Management Corp., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 97,966, at 90,978-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (settlement approved in derivative action
charging payment of excessive advisory fees); Korenstein v. Dreyfus Corp. [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,238, at 96,703 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (opinion summary). In one
of the earliest S 36(b) actions, the parties reached a settlement agreement after the court
denied defendant's motion to dismiss. See Boyko v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692, 696
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (denying motion to dismiss under rule 23.1 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Lerner v. Reserve Management Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,036, at 91,367 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (describing court approval of settlement agreement of
parties in Boyko v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). In Krasnerv. Dreyfus
Corp., the District Court for the Southern District of New York approved perhaps the largest
settlement in a S 36(b) action. See 90 F.R.D. 665, 667-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In Dreyfus, the
court acknowledged that no judicial precedent existed for determining the fairness of advisory fees. See id. at 668. The court stated, however, that a settlement determination only
requires the court to make a general assessment of whether the advisory fee is fair within
the meaning of the ICA, and also to determine whether the terms of the settlement are
fair and reasonable in light of the plaintiffs probability of success after a trial on the merits.
See id. Under the settlement agreement in Dreyfus, the adviser, Dreyfus Corporation, will
pay the fund, Dreyfus Liquid Assets, Inc., $2.82 million by 1986. See id. at 672. Additionally,
the parties agreed to change the advisory fee schedule from a fixed percentage rate of
fund assets to a declining scale rate. Id. at 673.
11FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
11See Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982); Fox v. Reich & Tang,
Inc., 692 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nom. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox,
51 U.S.L.W. 3646 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1983) (No. 82-1200); Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 85 (1982); Untermeyer v. Fidelity Daily Income Trust, 580 F.2d
22 (1st Cir. 1978); Jerozal v. Cash Reserve Management, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 99,019 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Blatt v. Dean Witter Reynolds Intercapital, Inc., 528 F. Supp.
1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1981;, Wolfson v. Cooper,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,634 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Boyko v.
Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
40 FED. L Civ. P. 23.1. Rule 23.1 requires shareholder derivative action complaints to
allege that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the complained of transaction,
and to allege that the action was not collusive to confer federal jurisdiction. Id.
4, 68 F.R.D. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
41

See id. at 696.

'3 See id. The Boyko court stated that since the mutual fund is controlled by its ad-
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concluded that demand is futile in a section 36(b) action whenever at least
one affiliated or interested director sits on the board of the mutual fund."'
In other early decisions, courts also did not dismiss shareholder section 36(b) suits for failing to satisfy the rule 23.1 demand requirement. 5
In 1981, however, the Southern District Court of New York in Markowitz
v. Brody" dismissed two section 36(b) shareholder claims for failing to
make a demand.47 The Markowitz court rejected one plaintiffs argument
that the demand requirement does not apply to section 36(b),48 and stated
that the rule 23.1 demand requirement is excused only when fifty percent
or more of the mutual fund's directors are interested."9 Shortly after the
Markowitz decision, however, another federal district court in the same
district decided in Blatt v. Dean Witter Reynolds Intercapital,Inc.- that
the demand requirement is inherently futile in section 36(b) suits.51 In more
recent decisions, the Southern District of New York has contradicted itself
again by holding that section 36(b) suits are not exempt from the rule
23.1 demand requirement.52
Three recent United States circuit court of appeals decisions have
increased the judicial discord regarding the application of the demand reviser, the requirement of demand would result in the dismissal of most, if not all, shareholder
36(b) actions. See id.
" See id.; supra note 24 (definitions of affiliated directors and interested directors).
The Boyko court stressed that the court's decision was not a holding that S 36(b) has abrogated
rule 23.1. See 68 F.R.D. at 696.
See, e.g., Untermeyer v. Fidelity Daily Income Trust, 580 F.2d 22, 23-24 (1st Cir.
1978) (vacating lower court's judgment dismissing § 36(b) action for failing to allege adequate excuse for not making demand); Wolfson v. Cooper, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,634, at 90,152-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (demand requirement satisfied by
demonstration of futility, but judgment for defendants because excessiveness of fees unproven); Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F. Supp. 1318, 1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (demand excused
in § 36(b) suit when demand would have been fruitless), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943 (1978).
,690 F.R.D. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
See id. at 549, 554-61, 563.
4'8See id. at 555. The Markowitz court decided that the demand requirement
is applicable to § 36(b) suits because an investment company has a cause of action under § 36(b).
See id. at 557 n.12, 560 n.18.
" See id. at 559. The Markowitz court held that the board of directors of a mutual
fund may not terminate a § 36(b) action. See id. at 562. The court stated, however, that
by providing a means by which the fund directors can voice approval of the challenged
fee, the demand requirement serves as a means by which the board can influence the court
and thereby protect the investment adviser from strike suits. See id.
528 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
",See id. at 1156. The Blatt court held that investment company directors may not
terminate § 36(b) suits and that S 36(b) does not provide the directors with the right to
institute a suit. See id. at 1155. The Blatt court concluded, therefore, that the basis of the
demand requirement in the ordinary derivative suit does not apply in a §36(b) action. See id.
' See Jerozal v. Cash Reserve Management, Inc. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,019, at 94,822 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (section 36(b) action not exempt from rule 23.1 demand
requirement); Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 94, 95, 96-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (demand
required in § 36(b) suit), rev'd, 692 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3646
(U.S. Mar. 7, 1983) (No. 82-1200).
45
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quirement in section 36(b) suits by reaching contradictory conclusions on
the issue.' The First Circuit, in Grossmanv. Johnson,54 held that the rule
23.1 demand requirement is applicable to section 36(b) suits.5 5 The plaintiff in Grossman,a shareholder of Fidelity Municipal Bond Fund, Inc. (FMB
Fund), brought suit against FMB Fund's investment adviser, Fidelity
Management & Research Company (FMR), for receiving allegedly excessive advisory fees in violation of section 36(b).5" The plaintiff asserted
that FMR's compensation was disproportionate to the cost of performing
advisory and management services because FMR's fee rate had remained
based on a fixed percentage of FMB Fund net assets during a period in
which the assets had increased substantially. ' Because the plaintiff did
not make a demand on FMB Fund directors prior to filing suit, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff
had failed to comply with rule 23.1.1
In Grossman, the First Circuit rejected the plaintiff's argument that
Congress did not intend the rule 23.1 demand requirement to apply in
section 36(b) suits.59 The First Circuit decided that even if investment com0 See supra note 22 (circuit courts with conflicting decisions on applicability of demand
requirement in § 36(b) suits).
674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 85 (1982).
See id. at 119-23.
Id. at 117-18.
57 89 F.R.D. 656, 658 n.2 (district court opinion). The Grossman plaintiff alleged that
FMR received about 10% of FMB Fund's income as compensation while other funds of
the same type pay well-qualified advisers as little as .15% of fund income. See id.; Comment, DirectorTermination of Mutual Fund Advisory Fee Suits: Grossman v. Johnson, 62
B.U.L. REv. 601, 604 n.21 [hereinafter cited as DirectorTermination](describing growth of
FMB Fund's assets as asserted in Grossman plaintiffs brief).
1 674 F.2d at 118. The district court in Grossmanallowed the plaintiff to send a demand
letter to the directors and to amend the complaint. Id. In response, the FMB Fund formed
a litigation committee to investigate the plaintiffs demand. Id. After six months, the litigation committee concluded that the suit was not in the best interests of FMB Fund. 89 F.R.D.
at 658-59. The district court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to file a timely
demand, and, alternatively, granted summary judgment based on the litigation committee's business judgment recommendation to terminate the suit. See 674 F.2d at 118; Director Termination, supra note 57, at 604-06 (analysis of Grossman district court's decision
to allow director termination of plaintiffs S 36(b) claim); infra note 60 (defining director
termination).
"' See 674 F.2d at 119-25. The First Circuit in Grossman interpreted the language of
5 36(b), which states that any shareholder recovery is on behalf of the investment company,
as signifying that a § 36(b) action is derivative. See id. at 120. The Grossman court stated
that the legislative history of § 36(b) is ambiguous on the issue of whether Congress intended
the demand requirement to apply in S 36(b) suits. See id. at 121. The court recognized Congress' concern over the prior ineffectiveness of independent directors in correcting excessive
advisory fees and Congress' intent to give the courts a significant role in determining whether
advisory fees are excessive. See id. The court stated, however, that Congress placed an
equal emphasis on the authority and responsibility of the directors. See id. The Grossman
court held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are presumed to apply unless congressional intent clearly suggests otherwise, and therefore held that the rule 23.1 demand requirement applies in § 36(b) suits. See id. at 122-23; FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.

1100

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1091

pany directors may not exercise their business judgment to terminate
shareholder section 36(b) suits," the demand requirement is useful in providing directors with the opportunity to decide whether to accede to the
views of the complaining shareholders." The Grossman court, therefore,
dismissed the plaintiff's suit for failing to comply with rule 23.1, and
decided that a ruling was not necessary on the district court's summary
judgment granting director termination of the suit.'
After the First Circuit's decision in Grossman, the Second Circuit in
Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc. 3 held that shareholders instituting section 36(b)
suits do not have to make a demand on the investment company's board
of directors. 4 In Fox, a shareholder of Daily Income Fund, Inc. (DI Fund)
alleged that DI Fund paid excessive fees to its adviser, Reich & Tang,
Inc. 5 Prior to filing suit, the plaintiff in Fox did not make a demand on
' See id. at 121. The Grossman court was aware that the United States Supreme Court
had suggested that directors may not terminate shareholder S36(b) actions. Id. (citing Burks
v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (dictum) (1979)). The Grossman court reasoned that although
the Supreme Court's statement in Burks may have been dictum, the statement formed an
integral part of the Court's holding. See 674 F.2d at 121 n.12.
Director termination occurs when a court dismisses a shareholder derivative action
after finding that the board of directors exercised proper business judgment when the board
concludes that the suit would not be in the best interests of the corporation. See 13 W.
FLETCHER. CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS %5822, 5969 (rev. perm. ed.
1980). In addition to making a demand on directors, therefore, shareholders instituting a
traditional derivative suit must demonstrate that the court should not respect the directors' decision against bringing suit. See Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in
Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 168,191 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Demand
Requirement]; infra note 150 (director termination not available in 5 36(b) suits).
"1See 674 F.2d at 121. The Grossman court stated that the one-year limitation period
on damages under S 36(b) is not a sufficient reason for excluding the rule 23.1 demand requirement in S 36(b) actions. See id. at 122; infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text (oneyear limitation period on damages under S 36(b)). The Grossman court stated that if the
requirement of demand delayed a S 36(b) suit and forced the plaintiff to assert a later oneyear period of excessive advisory fee payments, the amount of excessive fees recoverable
would probably not decrease. See id. The court postulated that in the unusual case in which
the recoverable amount might decrease, a district court could allow the suit to proceed
without awaiting the directors' response to demand. See id. In Weiss v. TemporaryInvestment Fund, the Third Circuit noted this postulation by the Grossman court, but the Third
Circuit chose not to reinforce it. See 692 F.2d 928, 938 n.10 (3d Cir. 1982).
2 See 674 F.2d at 126; supra note 58 (Grossman district court termination of S 36(b)
action); infra note 150 (director termination not available in S 36(b) suits).
692 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nom. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox,
51 U.S.L.W. 3646 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1983) (No. 82-1200).
See id. at 253, 262. The Fox court recognized that the case presented an issue of
first impression to the Second Circuit. See id. at 252.
65 Id. In Fox, DI Fund paid Reich & Tang, Inc. at a set rate of .50/o of the DI Fund's
net assets. Id. at 253. The fixed rate fee structure is unlike those of many mutual funds
that pay at downward-scaled rates. See supra note 4 (mutual fund fee schedules). During
a period of less than three years, the assets of DI Fund increased enormously, and as a
result, Reich & Tang, Inc's advisory fees increased from about $375,000 in 1978 to more
than $2 million in 1980. 692 F.2d at 252-53. The plaintiff in Fox alleged that the extraordinary rise in advisory fees was unjustified since Reich & Tang, Inc.'s management of DI
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DI Fund's board of directors.' The plaintiff asserted instead that section
36(b) actions are exempt from the demand requirement of rule 23.1.17 The
district court in Fox concluded that a rule 23.1 demand is required in suits
brought under section 36(b), and therefore dismissed the plaintiffs claim
for failure to make a demand on DI Fund's directors before filing suit.68
In analyzing whether shareholders must make a demand on directors
as a prerequisite to filing a section 36(b) suit, the Second Circuit initially
established that rule 23.1 would operate only if the court found that the
shareholders' action was derivative. The Fox court maintained that to conclude that shareholder section 36(b) suits are derivative, the court must
find that investment companies have an independent private right of action under section 36(b).71 As the Fox court observed, however, the
statutory language of section 36(b) expressly authorizes only the SEC or
fund shareholders to bring suit for excessive advisory fees.71 Referring
to recent United States Supreme Court policy regarding the implication
of private statutory rights of action, the Fox court declared that courts
should not assume casually that Congress intended to create additional
remedies by implication under a statute that specifically provides express
rights of action. 72 The court examined the legislative history of section
Fund was not sophisticated and did not require highly paid securities analysts. Id. at 253.
The plaintiff asserted that the managerial function of Reich & Tang, Inc. was simply a
process of "turning over" money market instruments with a few institutions. Id.
692 F.2d at 253.
87 Id.
" Id.; see 90 F.R.D. 94, 95, 96-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (district court opinion in Fox). The
district court in Fox agreed with the plaintiff's argument that a fund's- board of directors
may not terminate a § 36(b) suit. See 90 F.R.D. at 96 (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,
484 (1979)). The district court ruled, however, that the demand requirement was still necessary
to provide fund directors with an opportunity either to avoid a lawsuit by remedying the
plaintiffs grievance, or possibly to litigate the issue themselves. See id.; see also id. at n.2
(recognizing judicial dispute over whether investment company right of action exists under
S 36(b)).
" See 692 F.2d at 253-54 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1). In Fox, DI Fund argued that even
if the court ruled that investment funds cannot institute S 36(b) actions, the demand requirement still is necessary in order to make use of informal methods of recovering excessive advisory fees. See id at 254 & n.7. DI Fund suggested that the availability of informal means of director control, such as negotiation with advisers for refunds and termination of advisory contracts, should be sufficient to require shareholder plaintiffs to make
demands on directors. See id. at 254 n.7. The Fox court doubted that the informal methods
of director control suggested by DI Fund would have a positive effect and held that, in
any case, rule 23.1 would require demand on fund directors only if the fund itself had a
private right of action. See id. at 254 & n.7.
70 See id. at 254 & n.7.
71 See id. at 254; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976).
See 692 F.2d at 255 (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1981)). The Fox court criticized, as being inconsistent with
congressional policy, the Grossman court's argument that Congress could have believed
that Congress did not need to expressly specify that investment funds have a right of action under S 36(b). See id. at 256 (citing Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115, 120 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 85 (1982)).
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36(b) in search of persuasive evidence of congressional intent contrary
73
to the statute's exclusion of a cause of action for investment companies.
Finding that Congress promulgated section 36(b) so that courts effectively
could counteract the inherent conflicting interests of fund directors in the
setting of advisory fees,74 the Fox court maintained that Congress could
not have contemplated that fund directors would assume the role of suing
their advisers.'5 The Fox court concluded, therefore, that investment funds
do not have a right of action under section 36(b), and consequently
shareholder section 36(b) suits are not derivative and do not invoke the
6
rule 23.1 demand requirement.1
Although concluding that the rule 23.1 demand requirement does not
apply in section 36(b) suits, the Fox court also briefly examined the policy
of requiring demand in shareholder suits in light of the distinctiveness
of the section 36(b) right of action.7 The Fox court noted that fund directors do not have power to terminate section 36(b) suits, and therefore
the traditional justification for the demand requirement does not exist. 8
Furthermore, because section 36(b) limits recovery to the adviser's receipt
of excessive compensation within one year prior to commencement of the
suit,79 the court declared that the delay caused by the directors' review
of the shareholder grievance would preclude full recovery in many cases.'
The Fox court suggested that Congress was aware of this hazard, and
therefore Congress would not have developed the one-year limitation on
recovery if the demand requirement was to apply in section 36(b)
litigation.81 The Fox court recognized the value of the demand requirement in standard shareholder derivative suits, but concluded that because
of the unique nature of a section 36(b) lawsuit, the requirement of
shareholder demand on fund directors would be a futile exercise.2
In Weiss v. Temporary Investment Fund, Inc.,' the most recent appellate court decision on the section 36(b) demand requirement issue, the
Third Circuit held that a shareholder section 36(b) action is a derivative

See 692 F.2d at 256-61.
T'See id. at 259 (citing S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4897, 4898).
" See id. Although the Fox court recognized that Congress desired disinterested fund
directors to watch over the management of investment funds, the court suggested that
by referring to the powers of disinterested directors Congress merely intended to declare
that directors have obligations to conduct business in a responsible manner. See id. at 260.
See id. at 261.
See id. at 261-62.
' See id. at 261 (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 483-86)).
See 15 U.S.C. S 80a-35(b)(3) (1976).
o See 692 F.2d at 261-62; infr note 157-58 and accompanying text (burden of one-year
limitation period under S 36(b)).
81 See id. at 262.

See id.
692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982).
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suit subject to the rule 23.1 demand requirement." The plaintiff in Weiss,
a shareholder of Temporary Investment Fund (TI Fund), alleged that Provident Institutional Management Corporation (Provident Management),
the adviser and manager of TI Fund, and Shearson Loeb Rhodes, Inc.
(Shearson), the underwriter and a partial administrator for TI Fund,
breached their fiduciary duties under section 36(b) by receiving excessive
compensation from TI Fund.85 In bringing suit to require Provident
Management and Shearson to repay all excessive fees to TI Fund, the
plaintiff acknowledged in his complaint that he had not made a demand
however, that demand is
on TI Fund directors.' The plaintiff asserted,
7
suits.
36(b)
section
to
not a prerequisite
The Weiss court initially discussed the plaintiffs argument that a
shareholder suit under section 36(b) is not a derivative action, and therefore
is no subject to the rule 23.1 demand requirement.8 The Third Circuit
relied on a test that the Supreme Court developed in Cort v. Ash" to determine whether a federal statute implicitly contains a private right of action.
Concluding that the Cort requirements do not preclude the implication
of an investment company remedy under section 36(b), the Weiss court
held that the investment company has a right of action, and therefore
the shareholder section 36(b) action is derivative 1
See id. at 933-42.
692 F.2d at 931. In Weiss, TI Fund paid Provident Management'and Shearson advisory fees based on a declining-scale percentage rate of TI Fund's assets. Id. Provident
Management and Shearson each received .175% of the first $300 million in TI Fund's assets,
.15% of the next $300 million, .125% of the third $300 million, and .1% of average assets
in excess of $900 million. Id. The surge in the popularity of money market funds led to
a dramatic increase in TI Fund's assets, producing a proportionate rise in the amount of
advisory compensation that TI Fund paid to Provident Management and Shearson. See id.
MId.

Id. The district court in Weiss determined that shareholders must make a demand
on directors before filing § 36(b) claims. Id. at 932; see 516 F. Supp. 665, 668-70 (D. Del.
1981). Finding that the plaintiff's demand on TI Fund's directors would not have been futile,
the district court refused to excuse demand and dismissed the plaintiffs complaint. See
692 F.2d at 932; 516 F. Supp. at 671-73.
See 692 F.2d at 934-36.
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
See 692 F.2d at 934-36.

9' See id. at 936. The Weiss court held that because the investment company is the
intended beneficiary of S 36(b), the implication of a S 36(b) right of action for investment
companies conforms to the first factor of the four-part Cort v. Ash test. See id. at 935. In
evaluating the second Cort factor, the Weiss court did not find that Congress made an explicit expression that the investment company has a right of action under S 36(b). See id.
The Weiss court decided, however, that Congress presumably knew of the implication of
investment company rights of action at common law and under ICA provisions existing
prior to the 1970 amendments. See id. at 935-36. The court concluded, therefore, that Congress implicitly approved of the incorporation of the investment company's right to sue
under § 36(b). See id. The Weiss court also held that an implied S 36(b) cause of action for
investment companies conforms to the third factor of the Cort test because an investment
company right of action provides another method of recovering excessive advisory fees,
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The Weiss court next considered the plaintiffs argument that the
legislative history and statutory scheme of section 36(b) manifest Congress' intent to excuse shareholder section 36(b) suits from the rule 23.1
demand requirement9 The Weiss court decided that the excerpts of
legislative history cited by the plaintiff did not demonstrate direct congressional intent to eliminate the demand requirement,93 and the court
referred instead to passages reflecting Congress' intent to preserve the
role of management. 4 In discussing the one-year limitation period on
damages under section 36(b), the Weiss court declared that the provision
would not reduce the allowable recovery in most suits, and therefore was
not an indication that Congress intended to eliminate the demand
requirement. 5 The Weiss court also decided that even if directors may
not terminate section 36(b) suits," the demand requirement provides directors with the opportunity to resolve shareholder grievances without resorting to litigation. 7 The Third Circuit concluded, therefore, that the nule
and therefore is consistent with the underlying purposes of the statute. See id. at 936. Finally,
the Weiss court found that the implication of an investment company right of action under
S36(b) satisfies the fourth and final Cort requirement by not creating any interference with
traditional state law coverage. See id.
1 See id. The Weiss court established at the outset that a presumption exists that
rule 23.1, like all Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, applies in any civil suit brought in federal
district court unless inconsistent with a congressional enactment. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ.

P. 1 and 28 U.S.C. S 2071 (1976)).
"3See 692 F.2d at 937. In support of his argument, the plaintiff in Weiss cited excerpts
from the legislative history of S 36(b) that suggest Congress' awareness that unaffiliated
directors have been unable to obtain alterations in the level of advisory compensation, and
Congress' intention to establish an effective means by which shareholders and courts could
enforce the fiduciary obligations of investment advisers. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 2337,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 131, 143, 146 (1966), and S. REP. No. 184,91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted
in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4897, 4898).
See id. (citing S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 6, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4897, 4902-03). The Weiss court cited a statement from the congressional
hearings on the proposed ICA amendments in which then SEC Chairman Hamer Budge
suggested that a shareholder cause of action would not encourage nuisance suits because
of safe-guards within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at 938 (citing Hearings
on H.R. 11995, S. 2224, H.R. 13754 and H.R. 14787 Before the Subcomm. of Commerce and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 201
(1969)). The Weiss court interpreted the statement as referring to the rule 23.1 demand
requirement. See id.
" See 692 F.2d at 938; 15 U.S.C. S80a-35(b) (1976); infra notes 157-59 and accompanying
text (describing one-year limitation period on damages under S 36(b)). The Weiss court
recognized that at least one court has identified the S 36(b) limitation period as a basis
for suggesting that the demand requirement should not apply to section 36(b) suits. 692
F.2d at 938 (citing Blatt v. Dean Witter Reynolds Intercapital, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1152, 1155
(S.D.N.Y. 1982)). The Weiss court stated, however, that shareholders could make a demand
promptly and directors could consider the demand in an expeditious manner. See id.
" See 692 F.2d at 939. The Weiss court conceded that the Supreme Court has suggested strongly that directors may not terminate S 36(b) suits, but the court maintained
that the impact of the Supreme Court's message was unclear. See id.; infra note 150 (director termination not applicable to 5 36(b) suits).
See 692 F.2d at 942.
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23.1 demand requirement applies to section 36(b) actions because depriving directors of the opportunity to respond to shareholder grievances
would frustrate the ICA's objective of strengthening investment company
management through its independent directors."
The Weiss, Fox, and Grossman courts recognized that the rule 23.1
demand requirement will apply to section 36(b) shareholder actions only
if the suits are derivative.99 In contrast to a direct shareholder action,
a derivative suit is an action shareholders institute on behalf of the corporation, rather than for the direct benefit of the individual shareholders. 1"
In direct actions, the shareholder plaintiff generally is the recipient of
the award, while in derivative actions the recovery returns to the corporation's treasury.10' Since shareholders bring section 36(b) suits to
recover excessive advisory fees on behalf of the investment company, 2
the section 36(b) action resembles a traditional derivative suit."3 Perhaps
because of this outward similarity, the Supreme Court has described the
shareholder section 36(b) suit as a derivative action." A prerequisite to
a derivative action, however, is that the corporation must have the right
of action that the shareholders seek to assert." 5 The corporation must
have a cause of action in derivative suits because the corporation is the
6
true party in interest and the shareholders are merely nominal plaintiffs.11
"8See id. One of the Weiss judges, filed a lengthy dissent to the majority's holding
on 5 36(b). See id. at 944-53 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (concluding demand requirement inapplicable to § 36(b) suits).
0 See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 933-34; Fox, 692 F.2d at 253-54; Grossman, 674 F.2d at 120;
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (applying only to derivative actions by shareholders).
"I See H. HENN. HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BusINEss ENTERPRISES 756
(2d ed. 1970); 13 W. FLETCHER, supranote 60, at § 5939. A shareholder action is direct, rather
than derivative, when the corporation does not suffer the alleged injury, and the plaintiff
claims injury as an individual shareholder. See 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 60, at S 5911.
Examples of direct shareholder actions include claims alleging fraud directly affecting the
plaintiff, alleging violation of a right belonging severally to the plaintiff, or alleging the
plaintiffs involvement in a contractual dispute. See id.
"I See Note, DerivativeActions: Policy ConsiderationsLeading to Choice of Derivative
Form, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 127, 127 (1952).
...
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976) (authorizing shareholder action to sue adviser on
behalf of investment company for breach of fiduciary duty with respect to compensation);
Weiss, 692 F.2d at 935 (recovery in shareholder S 36(b) suit reverts to investment company
and not to plaintiff); Fox, 692 F.2d at 255 (same).
" See Grossman, 674 F.2d at 120 (shareholder suits on behalf of company normally
derivative). A shareholder suit ordinarily is derivative when the action seeks to recover
corporate assets or is based on a contract between the corporation and a third party. 13
W. FLETCHER. supra note 60, S§ 5926-5927.
" See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979) (dictum).
' See 13 W. FLETCHER, supranote 60, S 5947; N. LATTIN. THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 349
(1959).
"' See 13 W. FLETHCER, supra note 60, S 5939. Derivative suits seek to enforce rights
belonging to a corporation when the corporation fails to act in its own behalf. See N. LATTIN, supra note 110, at 349; 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1 .16[1] (2d ed. 1982). The
derivative suit, therefore, is subject to any limitations affecting the corporate right of ac-
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The rule 23.1 demand requirement, therefore, is applicable only to
shareholder derivative actions brought to enforce a right that the corporation itself may assert.1 17 Because section 36(b) does not provide an
express right of action in favor of the investment company,' 8 an implied
corporate right of action must exist for the rule 23.1 demand requirement
to apply. ' °9
A determination of whether an implied right of action exists for the
investment company under section 36(b) necessarily involves consideration of the Supreme Court's policy regarding the implication of private
remedies from federal statutes."1 In establishing a pattern of restricting
the implication of statutory remedies in recent decisions,"' the Supreme
tion since the shareholders derive their right of action from the corporation. 7A C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1834 (1972).
1I" See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (applies only when shareholder's corporation fails to enforce
right corporation properly may assert).
l See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976) (providing express action only for SEC and shareholders
of investment companies); Weiss, 692 F.2d at 934 (recognizing that express language of 5
36(b) does not authorize right of action for investment company); Fox, 692 F.2d at 254-55 (same).
"0 See Fox, 692 F.2d at 254 (demand not required if investment company may not bring
suit under § 36(b)).
Il' See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 934-36 (citing Supreme Court policy as authority for finding
implied investment company right of action under S 36(b)); Fox, 692 F.2d at 254-61 (citing
Supreme Court policy as authority for determination that no implied investment company
right exists under § 36(b)); see also infra note 111 (evolution of Supreme Court policy on
implied causes of action).
" See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825,1837-39 (1982)
(in recent decisions Supreme Court has modified approach to implication of remedies from
federal statutes). The Supreme Court first recognized the existence of an implied private
cause of action arising from a federal statute in Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby. See 241
U.S. 33, 39-41 (1916) (railroad employee granted personal injury action based upon federal
statute prescribing railroad equipment standards). Later, in J.L CaseCo. v. Borak, the Court
held that courts could imply a right of action from a federal statute if the implied remedy
effectuated the purposes for which Congress enacted the statute. See 377 U.S. 426, 431-34
(1964) (holding cause of action implied under S 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
In Cort v. Ash, the Court established four factors relevant to the determination of whether
an implied cause of action arises from a federal statute. See 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (finding
no implied remedy under Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974). The relevant factors include whether the language of the statute indicates that the plaintiff is a
member of the class for whose benefit Congress enacted the statute, whether evidence
exists of legislative intent to create or deny a private remedy, whether the implication
of such a remedy is consistent with the underlying objectives of the legislation, and whether
the remedy is traditionally a concern of state law. Id. In Cannon v. University of Chicago,
the Court applied the Cort test again but warned that in the future the Court would imply
remedies under federal statutes only in limited situations. See 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979). Later,
in Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, the Court applied only the first two factors of the Cort
test. See 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979) (finding no cause of action implied under S 17(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934). The Supreme Court continued its restriction of the statutory
implication doctrine in TransamericaMortgageAdvisers, Inc. v. Lewis. See 444 U.S. 11, 18-24
(1979) (holding implied remedy exists under § 215 but not under § 206 of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940). The Transamerica Court decided that no implied cause of action
exists when a statute expressly provides alternative remedies, since Congress' creation
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Court has stated that the process for determining whether Congress implicitly intended to create a particular private right of action is first to
evaluate the statutory language, and then to interpret the statute in light
of its legislative history."' The statutory language of section 36(b), while
specifically creating rights of action only in favor of the SEC and investment company shareholders, states that the authorized plaintiffs sue "on
behalf" of the fund."' In Grossman, the First Circuit interpreted the "on
behalf of" language to denote that shareholder section 36(b) suits are
derivative.'
As the Second Circuit recognized in Fox, however, the
language indicating that plaintiffs institute section 36(b) suits on behalf
of the fund merely signifies that the plaintiffs, whether the SEC or investment company shareholders, seek to recover excessive advisory fees
and return them to the fund treasury.11 5 The section 36(b) action thus
resembles a derivative suit when shareholders are the plaintiffs," 8 but
the statutory language of the section does not imply that investment companies have a right of action against investment advisers for excessive
17
fees. 1
In examining the legislative history of section 36(b), the Third Circuit
in Weiss relied partly on precedent the Supreme Court established in
MerrillLynch, Pierce,Fenner& Smith v. Curran.""'In Curran,the Supreme
of certain remedies suggests that it was capable of providing others but chose not to. See
id. at 19-21. In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has reinforced the approach it applied
in Touche Ross and Transamericaby emphasizing that the critical determination is the intent of Congress when Congress enacted the statute as reflected by the statute's language
and legislative history. See, e.g., Jackson Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 102
S. Ct. 2202, 2207-10 (1982) (finding no cause of action implied under S 13(c) of the Urban
Mass Transportation Act of 1964); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 102
S. Ct. 1825,1837-48 (1982) (holding private right of action exists under Commodity Exchange
Act); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 11-21
(1981) (finding no implied right of action under Federal Water Pollution Control Act and
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972); California v. Sierra Club, 451
U.S. 287, 292-98 (1981) (finding no implied right of action under S 10 of Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899). See generally, Maher, Implied PrivateRights of Action and the
FederalSecurities Laws: A HistoricalPerspective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 783 (1980); Note,
The Implication DoctrineAfter Touche Ross and Transamerica: The State of Implied Causes
of Action in Federal Regulatory Statutes, 26 VILL. L. REv. 433 (1981).
11 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 13 (1980).
"' See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976).
11. See Grossman, 674 F.2d at 120; supra note 59 (Grossman interpretation of S 36(b)
"on behalf of" language).
' See Fox, 692 F.2d at 255.
11 See supra,notes 100-03 and accompanying text (shareholder suits to benefit corporation are normally derivative).
." See Fox, 692 F.2d at 255.

"I See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 935-36; see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v.
Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982). To support its finding that an implied investment company
right of action exists under § 36(b), the Weiss court relied heavily on the test that the Supreme
Court enunciated in Cort v. Ash. See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 934-36; see also Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975); supranote 91 (Weiss application of Cort test); supra note 111 (describing
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Court considered the focus of the implied action analysis in situations in
which Congress enacts amending legislation within a federal statutory
scheme for which courts already have recognized an implied remedy.'
The CurranCourt held that in such situations the inquiry is not whether
Congress implicitly intended to create a new remedy, but whether Congress intended to preserve the pre-existing judicially implied remedy.2
Applying the Currananalysis, the Weiss court concluded that Congress
assumed that an implied investment company right of action exists under
section 36(b) because, prior to the section's enactment, courts had implied
shareholder remedies under former section 36 and described them as
derivative actions.'' In suits prior to the 1970 amendment, however,
judicial decisions that described implied shareholder actions as derivative
did not reflect any understanding that the investment company had an

Cart test). As the Weiss dissent recognized, however, recent Supreme Court decisions have
modified greatly the significance of the Cort test. See 692 F.2d at 953 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); supra note 111 (evolution of Supreme Court policy on implied causes of action). In
Merrill Lynch, Pierce,Fenner,& Smith v. Curran,the Court suggested that the Cort test
is useful only as a secondary inquiry when direct evidence of congressional intent does
not lead to a conclusive determination that a federal statute implies a private right of action. See 102 S. Ct. at 1844; The Supreme Court,1981 Term, 96 HARv. L. REV. 62, 239 (1982)
(analysis of Merrill Lynch, Pierce,Fenner& Smith v. Curran).A strict reliance on the Crt
factors could mislead the implied action analysis under S 36(b) so that, for example, a finding that the investment company is the intended beneficiary of S 36(b) would satisfy the
first Cart factor but would not take into consideration the potential inability of fund directors to represent properly the investment company's interests. See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 935
(finding first Cart factor satisfied since investment company is intended beneficiary of S
36(b)); see also infra,text accompanying notes 135 & 136 (Congress probably did not believe
fund directors would sue advisors under S36(b) although investment company might benefit
from suit).
Although the First Circuit in Grossman found an implied investment company right
of action under § 36(b), the Grossman court did not evaluate the legislative history of S
36(b) to reach that determination. See Grossman, 674 F.2d at 120. The Grossmancourt simply
stated that the S 36(b) language indicating that plaintiffs bring suit on behalf of the fund
suggests that Congress believed that Congress was not required to specify that the investment company had a right of action. See id.; supra notes 114 & 115 and accompanying text
(contrasting interpretations of S36(b) "on behalf of" language by Grossman and Fox courts).
" See 102 S. Ct. at 1839.
12.See id. The CurranCourt

held that an implied right of action exists under the Commodity and Exchange Act (CEA) after finding that courts had implied the remedy prior
to congressional amendments to the CEA, and that the legislative history of the amendments indicated Congress intended to preserve the implied remedy. Id. at 1837-48.
12, See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 935-36. Because courts generally had described shareholder
common-law actions alleging excessive advisory fees as derivative actions, the Weiss court
cited the Currananalysis as authority for the court's conclusion that Congress expected
the S36(b) action to be derivative. See 692 F.2d at 935 n.9. Under the Curranholding, however,
the implied action analysis focuses on whether Congress intended to preserve a pre-existing
implied remedy only when courts imply the pre-existing remedy under a federal statute
that Congress subsequently amended. See 102 S. Ct. at 1839. The Currananalysis, therefore,
does not apply to common-law actions since they exist as a matter of state law and courts
do not imply them from federal statutes. See 692 F.2d at 953 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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implied right of action.1" The remedy that courts implied under former
sections 36(b), furthermore, is codified presently under section 36(a) of the
ICA, which is a substantially different provision than section 36(b).'
Because an implied investment company remedy did not precede section
36(b), therefore, the Curranrationale is not relevant to the determination
of whether Congress intended to create an implied investment company
right of action." The examination of the legislative history of section 36(b)
consequently is not focused on whether Congress intended to preserve
a pre-existing remedy, but rather whether Congress intended to create
a new investment company right of action under section 36(b). 125
To support a finding that Congress did not intend to create an investment company right of action under section 36(b), the Second Circuit in
Fox relied on the Supreme Court's analysis in Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association.'28 The Middlesex Court
determined that when a statute expressly provides specific enforcement
mechanisms, courts should not assume in the absence of strong evidence
of contrary legislative intent that Congress sought to authorize implied
rights of action." Section 36(b) explicitly authorizes a right of action for
the SEC and investment company shareholders, but the provision does
12 See Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369,371-85 (1st Cir.) (shareholder action under former
ICA provision in which court did not mention right of investment company to sue), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815, 816-20 (1st Cir. 1964) (same),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); Chabot v. Empire Trust Co., 301 F.2d 458, 459-62 (2d Cir.
1962) (same); Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 417-22 (2d Cir. 1961) (same).
" Compare 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1976) (authorizing SEC to bring action against investment company directors or advisers for breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct and empowering courts to enjoin violators) with id. § 80a-35(b) (authorizing shareholders
or SEC to sue investment adviser on behalf of investment company for breach of fiduciary
duty with respect to compensation). See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 935 (shareholder action under
former § 36 now 5 36(a) action). Although §36(a) does not provide an express cause of action
for shareholders, courts have implied a remedy for shareholders under the provision. See
Note, Termination of Section 36(b) Actions by Mutual Fund Directors:Are the Watchdogs
Still the Shareholders' Best Friends?, 50 FORDHAhi L. REV. 720, 728 n.72 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Termination of Section 36(b) Actions] (citing cases inferring shareholder right to
bring 5 36(a) suit); Note, Implied PrivateRights of Action Under the Investment Company
Act of 1940, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1069, 1087-88 (1983) (concluding implied cause of action
for shareholders exists under S 36(a)).
12 See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 953 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
"' See Curran,102 S. Ct. at 1839 (when Congress enacts legislation in statutory scheme
in which no implied remedy previously existed, focus of inquiry is congressional intent to
create impliedly new remedy).
453 U.S. 1 (1981); see Fox, 692 F.2d at 255 (citing Middlesex decision).
12 See 453 U.S. at 13-15. In Middlesex, the Supreme Court held that implied rights of
action do not exist under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 after finding that the enactments expressly
provide elaborate enforcement mechanisms. See id. The Middlesex Court reasoned that,
without strong evidence of contrary congressional intent, Congress' creation of specific express causes of action is conclusive evidence that Congress provided the precise remedies
it considered appropriate. See id. at 15.
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not state that the investment company itself may sue under section 36(b)."
In the absence of a decisive finding of contrary congressional intent,
therefore, the Middlesex rationale suggests that an implied remedy in favor
of the investment company does not exist under section 36(b)."
The legislative history of section 36(b) is ambiguous on the issue of
whether Congress intended to create a right of action for investment
companies."' While Congress enacted section 36(b) to create a more effective mechanism by which shareholders and the SEC could recover
"
payments of excessive advisory fees,13
' Congress expressed a desire that
independent investment company directors also play a significant role in
determining advisory compensation. 3' By strengthening the role of independent directors, however, Congress sought not to establish an investment company right of action under section 36(b), but rather to create
a means of providing more responsible and effective management of the
investment company industry." The central purpose of enacting section
36(b) clearly was to control the potential conflicts of interest confronting
investment company directors in the setting of advisory fees."' Congress,
therefore, probably did not contemplate that fund directors actually would

11 See 15 U.S.C. S 80a-35(b); supra note 108 and accompanying text (5 36(b) does not
provide express right of action for investment company).
12 See Fox, 692 F.2d at 255.
130 See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 935 (legislative history of S 36(b) contains no explicit congressional intent either to foreclose or to create investment company remedy); Fox, 692 F.2d
at 258 (legislative history of S 36(b) neither approves nor disapproves of investment company suits); Grossman, 674 F.2d at 121 (debate on legislative history of S 36(b) is close);
c.f., Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 1981) (S 36(b) language ambiguous) (quoting
JENNINGS & MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1396-97 (4th ed. 1977)),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 65 (1982).
31 See S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4897, 4901 (S 36(b) enacted to ease standard of determining excessiveness of advisory
fees).
"s See id. at 4903 (courts should not ignore directors' responsible determination of advisory fee).
" See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1979) (in strengthening role of independent directors, ICA assigns to them multiplicity of responsibilities including management
supervision and financial auditing); Fox, 692 F.2d at 260 (congressional intent to strengthen
role of independent directors is merely imposition of managerial responsibility). While emphasizing the strengthened role of independent directors, the Senate report introducing
S 36(b) only specified that either the SEC or shareholders may sue under the provision.
See S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4897, 4903.
1U See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480-81 (1979) (in enacting ICA, Congress concerned
about abuse potential inherent in investment company structure); Fox, 692 F.2d at 258-59
(Congress recognized source of excessive advisory fee problem was potential conflicts of
interest in investment company structure); Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.RD. 542, 552-53 (SD.N.Y.
1981) (Congress enacted § 36(b) out of concern that mptual fund industry structure prevented
arm's-length bargaining over advisory fee); S. REP. No. 184,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted
in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4897, 4901 (forces of arm's-length bargaining not present in investment company industry as in other sectors of economy).
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sue their advisers,3 5 even though the investment company would benefit
by recovering excessive advisory fees." Strong evidence of congressional
intent to imply an investment company right of action does not exist,
therefore, to override the presumption that Congress intended to provide the SEC and investment company shareholders with the sole means
to enforce section 36(b). 137 Since the investment company may not assert
an enforceable right under section 36(b), shareholder section 36(b) suits
are not derivative and the rule 23.1 demand requirement does not apply."
Even assuming a judicial determination that shareholder section 36(b)
suits are derivative,'" the distinctive nature of section 36(b) strongly suggests that Congress did not intend the rule 23.1 demand requirement to
apply in mutual fund advisory fee litigation.'4 ° The section 36(b) suit, due
to the many restrictions of the provision, differs from the traditional
shareholder derivative suit.' Under section 36(b), the plaintiff has the
burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty and may bring suit only
against the recipient of the allegedly excessive compensation, and not
against the investment company itself." In addition, the section 36(b) plaintiff may not recover excessive fees that the fund paid to the adviser prior
to one year before the institution of the suit, and damage awards may
not exceed actual damages nor the amount of compensation the adviser
has received. 43 The section 36(b) restrictions imply, therefore, that the
purpose of the provision is to deter the payment of excessive advisory
fees while not subjecting the investment adviser to exorbitant and
debilitating damage judgments.' The procedural limitations of the section 36(b) action also signify that shareholders sue not to gain large personal judgments, but rather to assist in the enforcement of the statute

" See Fox, 692 F.2d at 259 (a conclusion that role of independent directors includes
suing advisers defies logic).
11 See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 935 (investment company is intended beneficiary of S 36(b));
supra note 115 and accompanying text (fees recovered in § 36(b) return to fund).
1'3 See supra text accompanying note 129 (Middlesex analysis mandates that no implied
remedy exists when statute provides specific enforcement mechanisms without strong
evidence of contrary congressional intent).
' See supra note 107 and accompanying text (rule 23.1 demand requirement applies
only to shareholder actions seeking to enforce right of action corporation may assert).
11 See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 936 (concluding S 36(b) action is derivative); Grossman, 674
F.2d at 120 (same).
,' See Fox, 692 F.2d at 261-62 (finding distinctiveness of 5 36(b) suit precludes demand).
14 See id. at 262 (§
36(b) suit unlike typical shareholder derivative suit); Blatt v. Dean
Witter Reynolds Intercapital, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1152, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (§ 36(b) suit
distinguished from ordinary derivative suit); infra text accompanying notes 143-45
(characteristic differences between § 36(b) suits and traditional derivative suits).
H2 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(1), (3) (1976).
14 See id.

S 80a-35(b)(3).

See id. (limiting recoverable damages to compensation in excess of reasonable advisory fees); DirectorTermination, supra note 57, at 628 (procedural provisions of 5 36(b)
limit potential recovery while deterring adviser from breaching fiduciary duty).
14.
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as "private attorneys general". 14' Shareholder section 36(b) suits, therefore,
14
should be outside investment company control. 1
Despite the restrictive nature of section 36(b) suits, some courts have
held that the demand requirement is necessary to exhaust intracorporate
remedies properly.147 Other courts, however, have held that the demand
requirement does not have a legitimate purpose in section 36(b) litigation
because investment company directors may not terminate shareholder
suits." In shareholder derivative suits, the demand requirement generally
serves both to require exhaustion of intracorporate remedies and to allow
directors to terminate suits that are harmful to the corporation's best
interests. 49 Although conceding that directors may not terminate section
36(b) suits,150 the Weiss court declared that shareholders must make a
"' See Fox 692 F.2d at 255 (shareholders bring S36(b) suits as "private attorneys general"
to assist in enforcement of statute). In S 36(b) suits, the investment company treasury, not
the plaintiff, receives any monetary recovery that the court awards. See supra note 102
and accompanying text. Section 36(b) suits, however, clearly benefit shareholders as a whole
since a reduction in excessive advisory compensation will increase the value of fund shares.
See Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (advisory fee abuses potentially
affect shareholders since excessive payments reduce value distributed to shareholders).
Although the 36(b) plaintiff personally will not benefit greatly because recovery in shareholder
suits is normally minimal on a per share basis, the suit has the meaningful effect of deterring future abuses. See Coffee & Swartz, The Survival of the DerivativeSuit: An Evaluation
and a Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 304-05 (1981) (aggregated effect of shareholder derivative action is deterrence although typical recovery is minimal
on per share basis). Because individual shareholders do not receive compensation for bringing a § 36(b) action, the plaintiff's attorney is the driving force behind the lawsuit. See id.
at 316.
14. See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 950 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (shareholder S 36(b) suit is type
of private attorney general action outside control of directors).
"' See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 942 (demand requirement gives management opportunity to
pursue alternative remedies); Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542,561 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (demand
gives mutual fund opportunity to engage in informal negotiation); Demand Requirement,
supra note 60, at 171 (original purpose of demand was to prevent judicial interference until
intra-corporate remedies exhausted).
1.8 See Fox, 692 F.2d at 261 (traditional reason for demand requirement not applicable
partially because directors may not terminate § 36(b) suit); Blatt v. Dean Witter Reynolds
Intercapital, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1152, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (demand requirement not applicable
in S 36(b) suit since directors may not terminate plaintiff's suit nor bring suit themselves);
see also supra note 60 (director termination of derivative suits); infra note 150 (directors
may not terminate S 36(b) suits).
19 See Demand Requirement, supra note 60, at 169 (director termination of derivative
suits).
" See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 939 (acceding to strong signal from Supreme Court that directors may not terminate § 36(b) suits). In Burks v. Lasker, the Supreme Court stated in dictum that Congress did not intend investment company directors to have the power to terminate S 36(b) suits. See 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979). Recognizing that the statement, although
dictum, was an integral part of the Court's holding in Burks, lower courts have interpreted
the Burks statement as a strong indication that directors may not terminate § 36(b) suits.
See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 939; Fox, 692 F.2d at 261 (citing Burks for holding that directors
may not terminate § 36(b) suit); c.f. Grossman, 674 F.2d at 121 & n.12 (assuming arguendo
that directors may not terminate § 36(b) suits since Burks dictum formed integral part of
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demand so that directors informally may resolve shareholder grievances
and thereby avoid unnecessary lawsuits.' As the Fox court recognized,
however, investment company directors are unlikely to engage in effective negotiations with the adviser to recover allegedly excessive fees since
the directors necessarily approved payment of the advisory compensation originally.152 In the unlikely circumstance that directors are able to
negotiate effectively with the investment adviser, the negotiation could
occur during the pretrial stages of the litigation.1 1 In section 36(b) litigation, therefore, the elimination of the demand requirement will not affect

Court's holding). The Grossman district court held that directors may terminate 5 36(b)
suits. See Grossman v. Johnson, 89 F.R.D. 656, 664 (D. Mass. 1981); see also supra note 58
(Grossmandistrict court holding). The First Circuit in Grossman chose not to rule on the
district court's summary judgment that granted director termination of the suit. See 674
F.2d at 126; see also supratext accompanying note 62 (Grossmanholding). Citing Grossman
as authority, however, a district court in the First Circuit recently chose not to dismiss
a shareholder § 36(b) action on the recommendation of a litigation committee of disinterested
directors exercising business judgment. See Evangelist v. Fidelity Management & Research
Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.(CCH) 99,094, at 95,226 (1982); see alsoDirectorTermination,
supranote 57, at 614-31 (criticizing Grossman district court opinion and concluding director
termination of § 36(b) suits contrary to legislative intent). But see Termination of S 36(b)
Actions, supranote 123, at 733-43 (relying on Grossman district court opinion to conclude
director termination appropriate in S 36(b) suits).
"I' See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 942 (demand especially important if directors may not terminate § 36(b) suits since demand provides opportunity to resolve grievances without litigation). The Grossman court suggested that one of the purposes of applying the rule 23.1
demand requirement in § 36(b) cases is to discourage unjustified shareholder suits. See
Grossman,674 F.2d at 122. According to some critics, corrupt attorneys may initiate strike
suits to coerce settlements from corporations that seek to avoid litigation. See Dent, The
Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit,
75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96, 137 (1980) (critics claim derivative suits are subject to abuse by
unscrupulous attorneys seeking to extort corporate settlements). Commentators have suggested, however, that the beneficial deterrent effect on corporate management, caused by
the threat of possible strike suits, outweighs the potential harm strike suits might cause.
See N. LATTIN, supra note 105 at 140 (cleansing effect of threat outweighs possible strike suit
abuse). The trial judge, moreover, may dissuade potential absues of derivative suits. See
Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 302 (1973)
(discretion of trial judge may reduce effect of possible abuse).
11 See Fox, 692 F.2d at 254 n.7; Blatt v. Dean Witter Reynolds Intercapital, Inc., 528
F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (speculative at best that directors will satisfy shareholder
objectives since directors approved challenged fees). Rule 23.1 allows derivative suit plaintiffs to allege an excuse for not making a demand on directors. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
Courts generally excuse demand when the plaintiff demonstrates that a demand would meet
rejection by the directors. See 1 MOORE'S MANUAL, FED. PRAC. & PROCEDURE 14.07[8] (1982)

(courts dispense with demand when directors clearly would reject). The Fox court suggested
that investment company directors are always "interested," so that courts inevitably will
excuse demand in § 36(b) suits. See Fox, 692 F.2d at 261 n.13.
"I See Blatt v. Dean Witter Reynolds Intercapital, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1152,1156 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (nothing prevents directors from negotiating after commencement of suit and thereby
mooting plaintiffs' claims); c.f. Evangelist v. Fidelity Management & Research Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,094, at 95,224 (1982) (investment company negotiated reduction in advisory fees after receiving demand but plaintiff claimed fees remained excessive).
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the proper roles of investment company directors.'"
While the demand requirement is not necessary to maintain effective
investment company management, its application frustrates the adjudication of shareholder section 36(b) suits. 5 ' The plaintiffs task of making a
demand on directors in shareholder suits is not burdensome in itself.'
The section 36(b) one-year limitation period, however, may obviate full
recovery of excessive advisory fee payments if directors choose to prevent the plaintiffs from promptly filing suit.' Investment company directors could utilize the demand requirement to adjust advisory fees prospectively while delaying their response to shareholder demand, and consequently cause a significant reduction in the plaintiffs' potential
recovery.'58 As several courts have recognized, Congress would not have
developed intentionally a method by which directors could circumvent Congress' express intention that section 36(b) provide an effective means for
shareholders to sue for the recovery of excessive advisory fees.5 9 The
distinctiveness of the provisions of section 36(b), therefore, clearly suggests that Congress did not intend the demand requirement to apply to
mutual fund advisory fee suits. 5
Congress established section 36(b) in 1970 to create an effective means
by which investment company shareholders and the SEC could control
the potential conflicts of interest involved in the setting of mutual fund
advisory fees.' Since the provision became effective, courts have dismissed
shareholder section 36(b) actions for failing to make a demand on direc-

"4 See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 951 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (restrictive provisions in § 36(b)
minimize intrusion on director responsibility); see also supra note 133 (responsibilities of
investment company directors under ICA).
1" See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 943-44 (affirming dismissal of S 36(b) suit for failure to make
demand); Grossman, 674 F.2d at 115, 126 (same); Jerozal v. Cash Reserve Management, Inc.,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,019, at 94,822 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (dismissing 5 36(b) action
for failure to make demand); Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542, 562-63 (same).
" See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 938 (demand is simple procedure not burdensome to
shareholders); Demand Requirement, supra note 60, at 172 (shareholders satisfy demand
simply by mailing complaint to directors and threatening to bring suit unless corporation
enforces rights).
157 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b(3) (1976); supra text accompanying note 143 (S 36(b) plaintiff
may not recover excessive fees paid adviser prior to one year before institution of suit);
Fox, 692 F.2d at 261-62 (delay in director response to demand would preclude full recovery
in some cases by preventing plaintiffs from promptly filing suit); Blatt v. Dean Witter
Reynolds Intercapital, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (same).
"' See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 951 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). But see Grossman, 674 F.2d at
122 (district court could allow suit to proceed without awaiting director response).
's See Fox, 692 F.2d at 262 (Congress was aware of problem resulting from § 36(b)
one-year limitation period on damages); Blatt v. Dean Witter Reynolds Intercapital, Inc.,
528 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (same); c.f. Weiss, 692 F.2d at 951 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (Congress must have discounted director involvement because delays incident to corporate decision-making incompatible with one-year limitation period).
"4 See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text (distinctiveness of S 36(b)).
...
15 U.S.C. 5 80a-35(b) (1976); see supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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tors in compliance with rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."2
In 1982, three United States circuit courts of appeals reached contradictory conclusions in deciding whether shareholder plaintiffs must make a
demand on investment company directors prior to instituting a section
36(b) action. 63 The rule 23.1 demand requirement applies only to
shareholder suits that are derivative."4 A shareholder suit is derivative
rather than direct only when the corporation has the right of action that
the shareholders seek to assert. 6' Section 36(b), however, provides an express right of action only for the SEC and investment company
shareholders, 66 and the legislative history of section 36(b) does not reflect
congressional intent to create by implication an investment company right
of action.' 7 Since the investment company has no right to bring suit under
section 36(b),'68 shareholder section 36(b) suits are not derivative, and the
rule 23.1 demand requirement should not apply.'69 The conclusion that the
demand requirement is not applicable to mutual fund advisory fee litigation is consistent with Congress' creation of several restrictive provisions
within section 36(b).'7 0The distinctive nature of section 36(b) reflects Congress' intention that investment company shareholders bring suit independent of director control.17 ' Since mutual fund directors may not sue investment advisers nor terminate shareholder suits, 72 and since the filing
of a shareholder action will not render ineffective subsequent director
negotiations with investment advisers,' 73 the rule 23.1 demand requirement serves no beneficial purpose in section 36(b) litigation.
TIMOTHY J. KILGALLON

16 See supra note 155 (§ 36(b) actions dismissed for failure to make demand).
16

See supra notes 53-98 and accompanying text (discussing Weiss, Fox and Grossman

decisions).
16 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (applying only to derivative actions by shareholders).
1
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
"' See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976) (providing express action only for SEC and shareholders
of investment companies).
161 See supra notes 118-37 and accompanying text.
1
See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (investment company must have im-

plied right of action for rule 23.1 demand requirement to apply).
169 See Fox, 692 F.2d at 261 (concluding investment company does not have right to
action under § 36(b) and rule 23.1 does not apply).
17 See supra,notes 140 & 160 and accompanying text (distinctive nature of § 36(b) strongly
suggests that Congress did not intend rule 23.1 demand requirement to apply).
'
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text (investment company has no § 36(b)
right of action); supra note 155 (directors may not terminate S 36(b) suits).
17 See supra notes 152 & 153 and accompanying text (effective director negotiation
with adviser unlikely and not precluded by shareholder initiation of S 36(b) suit).

